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contacts test.65 The existence of the property within the state will be of
little assistance to the court in finding whether minimum contacts are
present. The consequence for all three types of in rem actions 6 is that what
was once simple and certain has become complicated and tenuous.
Nevertheless, despite the uncertainties and confusion Shaffer portends,
it is a decision which is long overdue. The concept of in rem jurisdiction
has proved over time to be an inadequate means to insure the fairness
which the Due Process Clause seeks to protect. Shaffer v. Heitner corrects
this defect.
RICHARD S. MILLIGAN
65 See text accompanying notes 52-57 supra.
, See note 21 supra.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
State Funding of Nontherapeutic Abortions • Medicaid Plans.
Equal Protection • Right to Choose an Abortion
Beal v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977).
Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977).
Poelker v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2391 (1977).
n Beal v. Doe' the United States Supreme Court held that Title XIX
of the Social Security Act' permits but does not require states participating
in the Medicaid program established by that Act to fund nontherapeutic
abortions. In the companion cases of Maher v. Roe3 and Poelker v. Doe,"
the same majority5 held in Maher that the Equal Protection Clause does not
require a state that funds childbirth and therapeutic abortions to also fund
the costs of nontherapeutic abortions, and in Poelker, that the Constitution
does not prohibit a state or city from forbidding the performance of elective
abortions in public hospitals while providing hospital services for child-
1 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977).
2 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970).
3 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977).
'97 S. Ct. 2391 (1977).
5 Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in dissents in all three cases.
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birth. Thus, the Court addressed both the statutory and constitutional issues
which have divided the lower federal courts.'
The respondents in Beal were pregnant women who were eligible to
receive medical assistance under Pennsylvania's federally approved Medicaid
plan. They were denied funding for desired abortions because the Pennsyl-
vania regulation limits such assistance to those abortions which have been
certified by physicians as medically necessary.7 After hearing the case, the
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania found that the
regulation was not inconsistent with Title XIX but that it did deny respon-
dents equal protection of the laws.' The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed on the statutory issue, finding that Title XIX prohibits
participating states from requiring a physician's certificate of medical
necessity as a condition for funding abortions during both the first and
second trimesters.'
Title XIX provides a means by which participating states distribute
federally funded medical assistance to two classes of needy people: the
"categorically" and the "medically" needy.'" To participate in the program,
states must provide for the first group and may provide for the second.'"
Those in the first group must be given financial assistance in at least five
designated general areas of medical treatment, including inpatient hospital
care, physician's services and family planning services.' As to the latter
r For courts deciding the statutory issue, see: Roe v. Ferguson, 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir.
1975); Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1974), rev'd and remanded, 522 F.2d
928 (2d Cir. 1975); Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y.
1972), aff'd in part sub nom. Ryan v. Klein, 412 U.S. 924, vacated and remanded in part,
412 U.S. 925 (1973). (In Roe v. Norton the district court held that the benefits were
required by statute if the state provides treatment for pregnancy; in the Klein case the dis-
trict court found that the statute permitted payment for elective abortions and prohibited
state regulations that impair a woman's right to have an abortion). For a comparison of
the lower court rulings on the statutory issue, see generally, Note, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 857
(1976). See also note 45 infra for listing of cases dealing with the constitutional issue.
7 97 S. Ct. at 2369. The state's definition of medical necessity includes three categories which
relate to a) a woman's health b) any incapacitating physical deformity or mental deficiency
of the infant that is anticipated c) pregnancy caused by statutory or forcible rape or incest
which may threaten mental or physical health of the woman. These findings must be con-
firmed by two physicians other than the attending physician and the procedure must be
performed in an accredited hospital. 97 S. Ct. at 2369 n.3, citing Brief for Petitioners, at 4,
citing 3 Pennsylvania Bulletin 2207, 2209 (Sept. 29, 1973).
8 Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 191 (W.D. Pa. 1974), modified, 523 F.2d 611
(3d Cir. 1975).
9 Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975).
10 The categorically needy refer to those persons with dependent children, the aged, the
blind and the disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (10) (A) (1970). The medically needy are
persons whose income is too great to qualify for cash assistance as the other group but yet
insufficient to meet costs of medical care. Id. § 1396a (10) (B).
"Id. § 1396d (a).
121d. § 1396 (a).
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group, the state is not compelled to give assistance in any particular area
of medical treatment, but is required to fund a minimum number of treat-
ment areas from a wide range of choices."
In reversing the Third Circuit's decision, Justice Powell, speaking for
the Court, based his determination on the statutory guidelines which provide
that the state Medicaid plans must establish "reasonable standards ...for
determining ... the extent of medical assistance under the plan which are
consistent with the objectives of [Title XIX]."' The Court found this to
indicate a "broad discretion" left to the states, limited only by the test of
reasonableness and consistency with objectives."
The majority noted that the objective of the Act was to enable "each
state, as far as practicable under the conditions of such State, to furnish...
medical assistance [to] individuals . . whose income and resources are
insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services."" Justice Powell
found that the state regulation easily met the test of reason because he
concluded, as Pennsylvania had, that abortions based on reasons other than
those allowed under the medical necessity definition of the state were not
necessary medical services and, therefore, no statutory mandate existed to
fund such procedures." ' Apparently, the Court categorized an abortion
other than one for health reasons among such elective medical services as
cosmetic surgery or cosmetic orthodontics. The majority conceded, however,
that there would be a "serious statutory question" if a state plan excluded
necessary medical treatment from its coverage. 8
The dissenting justices, however, through Justice Brennan, reasoned
from another viewpoint. They viewed the necessity requirement of the Act
to refer to medical conditions rather than to particular medical procedures,"'
and saw as unquestionable the fact that pregnancy is a condition requiring
medical services." Therefore, they asserted that because of the constitu-
tionally protected right recognized in Roe v. Wade,' two alternative medical
procedures existed for dealing with pregnancy: either "medical procedures
IsId. § 1396a (a) (13) (C).
14 Id. § 1396a (a) (17).
1597 S. Ct. at 2371.
16 42 U.S.C. § 1396.
1797 S. Ct. at 2371.
181d.
19 1d. at 2373.
20 id. See Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726, 729 (D. Conn. 1974); Klein v. Nassau County
Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496, 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
21410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). The abortion decision, during the first trimester, must be
left to the woman and her doctor. Once reached, the decision's effectuation must be free
from interference by the state.
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for its termination, or medical procedures to bring the pregnancy to term,
resulting in a live birth," with moral considerations alone to distinguish
them."
Justice Brennan also interpreted the Act and its legislative history as
placing the state under an obligation to provide that the "physician and
patient have complete freedom to choose those medical procedures for a
given condition which are best suited to the needs of the patient."23 He
argued that by requiring a certificate of "medical necessity" which is related
strictly to the woman's mental and physical health, Pennsylvania has cur-
tailed the autonomy of the doctor and patient in choosing the best method
of treatment based on that patient's needs."
Because Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton25 recognize abortion as a
legal alternative choice to childbirth subject to certain qualifications, the
dissent's viewpoint seems to be more consistent with the prior cases which
protect the right to make a choice free of unduly burdensome state inter-
ference. In Roe, the Court allowed such a private decision, based upon
factors which may or may not relate directly to health, 6 to be left strictly
to the woman and her doctor during the first trimester. Because of the
state's other interests in protecting the woman's health and the potential
life of the fetus, the state has the right to regulate procedures in the second
trimester and proscribe abortions in the third."
The Court in Beal also examined the affirmative policy considerations
that a state might have for a regulation of this type and the majority
agreed with the respondents that health and fiscal reasons are not well-
founded. 8 The health of the mother has been recognized to be endangered
more by normal childbirth than by early abortion." Therefore, the state
22 97 S. Ct. at 2373. See also Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 663 n.3 (D. Conn. 1975).
23 97 S. Ct. at 2374 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (a) (19) (1970)).
24 3 Pennsylvania Bulletin 2207, 2209 (Sept. 29, 1973) (the statute also provides for an
abortion if there is "documented medical evidence that an infant may be born with incapaci-
tating physical deformity or mental deficiency").
25 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
26 410 U.S. at 153.
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and
future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be
taxed by child care. There is also the distress for all concerned, associated with the
unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already
unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one,
the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.
All these factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider
in consultation.
27 410 U.S. at 164-65.
28 97 S. Ct. at 2371.
29 See 410 U.S. at 149,
[Vol. 11:2
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could not logically assert that the health of the mother was protected by
excluding funding for all nontherapeutic abortions (including those in the
first trimester) which involve little risk, while providing funding for child-
birth, which involves a greater risk. Also, it is difficult to accept the state's
contention that it has a reasonable financial interest in determining that a
nontherapeutic abortion is unnecessary medical care while determining that
child delivery and therapeutic abortions are necessary medical care for the
same condition.3" The costs of abortion are considerably lower than those
of prenatal and postnatal care and delivery. 1
The Court, therefore, did not contend that health or fiscal considera-
tions supported its determination that the state regulation was reasonable.
Instead, Justice Powell emphasized that the state has a "valid and important
interest in encouraging childbirth," which is expressly recognized in Roe
as the "important and legitimate interest [of the State] in protecting the poten-
tiality of human life."32 However, in Roe, the focus on this interest had been
to determine the point at which it became compelling. The Court stated
that "it is reasonable and appropriate for the State to decide that at some
point in time [this interest] . . . becomes significantly involved,""3 and that
this interest "grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term,"'"
becoming compelling at the point of viability. At this time the fetus is
presumed capable of living a meaningful life outside the womb. Because
of this presumption, "state regulation protective of fetal life after viability
thus has both logical and biological justification."3 The Roe Court, how-
ever, did not recognize this interest as being significant enough to warrant state
interference in the woman's decision until the point of viability. The Court
found her right to privacy in this area to be protected by the liberty guaran-
tees of the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.36 Nevertheless,
relying on Roe for support,' the Beal Court considered this state interest
adequate grounds upon which to find the state regulation limiting the
funding of abortions in all three trimesters of pregnancy to be reasonable.
Justice Powell suggested that an additional reason for interpreting the
statute as he did was the fact that abortions were illegal in 1965 when
30 97 S. Ct. at 2371.
31 Id. The costs have been estimated to average $64 for outpatient abortions and $177 for
inpatient operations. The average costs of prenatal care and delivery were $800. AFDC
payments were established to run $624 a year. See Note, 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 921, 941
n.135 (1973) (these are 1971 estimates).
32 97 S. Ct. at 2371, citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
33 410 U.S. at 159.
34 Id. at 162-63.
35 ld. at 163.
3S Id. at 153, 164.
37 97 S. Ct. at 2371-72.
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Congress passed Title XIX; thus it would be illogical to assume that
Congress required the states to fund them. 8 His interpretation of statutory
intent is much narrower than the view expressed by the Third Circuit, which
Justice Brennan accepts:
It is impossible to believe that in enacting Title XIX Congress intended
to freeze the medical services available to recipients at those which
were legal in 1965. Congress surely intended Medicaid to pay for
drugs not legally marketable under the FDA's regulations in 1965 which
are subsequently found to be marketable. We can see no reason why
the same analysis should not apply to the Supreme Court's legalization
of elective abortion in 1973.89
The majority also saw the administrative interpretation of the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, which parallels their own interpretation,
as persuasive reinforcement."°
The Court acknowledged that as a result of its decision in Beal which
provided that Title XIX permits, but does not require abortion funding, it
must also decide the constitutional questions raised when a participating
state funds childbirth and therapeutic abortions but refuses to fund nonthera-
peutic abortions. This question came before the Court in Maher v. Roe,"1
which involved a Connecticut regulation limiting Welfare Department fund-
ing of abortions in all trimesters to those that were "medically necessary,"
a term defined to include both physical and psychiatric necessity.'" The
respondents were women who had been denied funds for first trimester
abortions because of their inability to obtain the medical necessity certifi-
cate.
At the district court level, the state regulation had been invalidated
on the grounds that the Social Security Act required state funding of non-
therapeutic abortions.'" The court of appeals, however, remanded for con-
sideration of the constitutional claims raised by its finding that the Act did
not require, but merely allowed such funding." Consequently, the district
court invalidated the statute on the grounds that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.'5
as Id. at 2372.
.30 Id. at 2375, citing 523 F.2d at 622-23.
40 97 S. Ct. at 2375.
41 97 S. Ct. 2376.
2 'Id. at 2378 n.2.
43 380 F. Supp. at 730; see note 6 supra.
" 522 F.2d at 938-39; see note 6 supra.
45 408 F. Supp. at 665. The following lower federal courts also ruled that a state policy
which funded therapeutic abortions and delivery but refused to fund nontherapeutic abortions
violated the fourteenth amendment by creating a classification which could not be justified
[Vol. 11:21
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In Poelker, the companion case to Maher, the claim of unconstitutional
interference with a protected right was based on the inability of an indigent
woman in her first trimester of pregnancy to obtain a nontherapeutic
abortion at a city-owned public hospital in St. Louis." The Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit recognized that Doe's inability to obtain an abortion
was due to a combination of a policy mandate issued by the mayor of
St. Louis and the staffing practice of the hospital."
The Supreme Court concluded that neither the fact situation of Maher
nor of Poelker created a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Justice
Powell, speaking for the Court, acknowledged that equal protection claims
existed because various classifications of those similarly situated had been
created by the state regulation and city practices." However, he concluded
that there were no suspect classes involved and no impingement of a con-
stitutionally protected right." The majority indicated that the indigent
women were attempting to claim "an unqualified right to an abortion" and
that no such right had before been recognized.5" The Court reasoned that
the state had not acted affirmatively to interfere with respondents' decisions
to terminate their pregnancies and they were free, if they could find private
sources, to have nontherapeutic abortions. The only hurdle in their paths
was indigency, and the state's funding of abortions for different reasons or
the state's funding of childbirth had neither affected nor created their
poverty.51 Because the Court determined that there was no suspect class
based on wealth and that no fundamental right was being impinged by the
state in distinguishing between abortion and childbirth, the compelling state
interest test was inapplicable. The resulting classifications could, therefore,
be justified by the state upon a showing that this "scheme ... rationally
by a compelling state interest: Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1974), rev'd
and remanded on other grounds sub nom., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Doe
v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974); Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa.
1974), aff'd on other grounds sub nom., Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975); Doe
v. Westby, 383 F. Supp. 1143 (W.D.S.D. 1974), vacated and remanded, 420 U.S. 968
(1975) (for failing to rule on possible statutory grounds); Klein v. Nassau County Medical
Center, 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd in part sub nom., Ryan v. Klein, 412 U.S.
924, vacated and remanded in part, 412 U.S. 925 (1973). See also Note, 22 WAYNE L. REV.
857 (1976).
46 97 S. Ct. 2391.
'7 Id. at 2392. Specific directives were issued by the mayor several months after the Supreme
Court abortion decisions of Roe and Bolton. No abortions were to be performed "in the
city-owned public hospitals for reasons other than to save the mother from grave psycho-
logical injury or death." 515 F.2d at 543.
48 97 S. Ct. at 2381, 2392.
491d. at 2381. But see Marshall's dissent at 2397 suggesting that Justice Powell's reliance
on San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70, 117-24 (1973) might be too
narrow an interpretation of that case.
50 97 S. Ct. at 2382.
51 Id. at 2382-83.
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furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose . *"... " The justification
for the disparity in funding was advanced to be the interest recognized in
Beal, that of "encouraging childbirth."53
In attempting to understand the reasoning of the Court, it is necessary
to look further to the exact nature of the right which the respondents claim
was being impinged. In Roe the Court stated that the right of privacy,
which they felt to be founded in the fourteenth amendment's concept of
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, "is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."' "
The Court classified this as a "fundamental right" that could only be
regulated or interfered with by a "compelling state interest," and "that
legislative enactment must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake." 5 These conclusions led to the decision that if the
state has no compelling interests of its own to assert, "the attending physician,
in consultation with his patient is free to determine, without regulation by
the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be
terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated
by an abortion free of interference by the State."5"
By examining this right in the context of Maher, it is clear that the
state has voluntarily chosen to offer medical aid to indigents; there is no
constitutional or congressional mandate to do so. But once the state has
chosen to participate in the optional program, the methods adopted to
dispense this aid must not invidiously discriminate against any one particular
group nor unduly interfere in the exercise of any constitutionally guaranteed
right.5 The respondents in Maher asserted that once the state has chosen
to aid indigent pregnant women, the right recognized in Roe is impinged
if the granting of aid is conditioned upon the woman's choice concerning
her pregnancy. If a woman chooses to carry her child until the pregnancy
terminates in a live birth, the state will pay the expense. If the woman
chooses to terminate her pregnancy for a reason other than one deemed
acceptable to the state, she will be denied the aid she would have otherwise
received.
The majority in Maher rejected respondents' argument stating that
there is no direct state interference with their right to choose abortion or
5 2 Id. at 2381.
53 Id. at 2385.
54 410 U.S. at 153.
55 id. at 155. See Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
56 410 U.S. at 163 (emphasis added).
57 97 S. Ct. at 2380.
[Vol. 11:2
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effectuate it." But in the welfare setting, the fact that these women could
rarely, if ever, effectuate a decision to terminate a pregnancy without state
aid would appear to make the direct or indirect distinction of the majority
misplaced. The Court appears to view the respondents' claims in the same
light as any indigent who claims that his constitutional rights are being
impinged because of lack of money. The indigent has no recognized "right
to an abortion" that the state is obligated to fund on demand. But the state
has voluntarily chosen to eliminate some of the financial barriers indigents
face in obtaining adequate medical care. In doing so, the state has been
allowed to weight the choice on the side of childbirth by providing funds
and facilities for the birth. It has been allowed to discourage abortion in
every stage of pregnancy by refusing to fund the operation in the absence of
a state-approved reason. The medical necessity requirement poses an insur-
mountable obstacle for the vast majority of women on welfare who in con-
sultation with their doctors may have decided for any number of other
valid considerations that abortion is the appropriate action for them. These
women, who cannot afford private treatment, and these doctors, who cannot
afford to treat them without compensation, are effectively foreclosed from
effectuating that decision. 5 This type of state interference would appear to
be as direct and certainly more prohibitive than the technical requirements
struck down as unconstitutional in Doe v. Bolton (i.e., hospital accreditation,
committee approval, two-doctor concurrence, and residence requirements)."
The Court rejected the argument by respondents that the welfare funding
cases of Shapiro v. Thompson,"' Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,"
and Sherbert v. Verner" were appropriate precedent for the instant case.
The state residency requirement for receiving Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC) was struck down in Shapiro and a similar require-
ment in Memorial Hospital for receiving emergency medical care was also
invalidated. In both cases, the states were found not to have compelling
interests which justified creating classifications which might interfere with
the right to travel, a right based implicitly in the concept of liberty. " The
Sherbert case involved the withholding of unemployment compensation from
a woman whose religious beliefs prohibited her from working on Saturdays.
The Court noted, however, that the compensation would have been granted
58 Id. at 2382-83.
' See 97 S. Ct. at 2388, citing Wulff v. Singleton, 428 U.S. 106, 122 (1976).
60 410 U.S. at 194-200.
61 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
62415 U.S. 250 (1974).
63 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
64 394 U.S. at 627; 415 U.S. at 269. See also Justice Brennan's dissent in Maher. 97 S. Ct.
at 2388-90.
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to her if her refusal to work had been based on a variety of other nonreligious
reasons.65 In each of these cases the Court rejects as unacceptable, state
coercion to forego a constitutional right in order to gain benefits otherwise
provided. Justice Powell distinguished the first two cases on the basis of a
penalty analysis, and the third as involving a special "governmental obliga-
tion of neutrality" arising from the first amendment issues."8
Justice Powell in Maher avoided applying the compelling state interest
test by limiting his analysis to the requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause and relying on a distinction characterized by him as "a basic differ-
ence between direct state interference with a protected activity and state
encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy. '' 7
The state's refusal to fund nontherapeutic abortions is not seen as a direct
interference but rather as a scheme which furthers a legitimate state interest
of encouraging childbirth.6" But characterizing the state scheme in terms
of encouraging childbirth seems to ignore that this must of necessity encom-
pass also the converse activity of discouraging abortion. The Court in Roe
stated that there are no state interests in the first trimester which are more
significant than a woman's right to make this private decision without state
interference. 9 In his discussion of this distinction, Justice Powell expressed
his concern that if the arguments of the respondents are accepted and the
state is required to meet the "compelling state interest test," this will lead
to strict scrutiny in other areas of state regulation. He analogized that one
such area would be in legislation which requires the funding of public but
not private education."'
In his dissent in Maher, Justice Brennan argued that the majority was
making a distinction between laws that can be termed direct interference
or penalizing restrictions and those which merely encourage an alternate
activity."' He referred to the case of Carey v. Population Services Inter-
national," decided only twelve days prior to the instant case, as support for
his contention that the Court had previously refused to make such a dis-
tinction. Carey concerned a New York law which, inter alia, prohibited
the sale of contraceptives to adults by anyone other than licensed pharmacists.
65 374 U.S. at 398.
66 97 S. Ct. at 2383 n.8.
67 Id. at 2383.
68 Id. at 2385.
69 410 U.S. at 113.
70 97 S. Ct. at 2384.
71 Id. at 2388.
72 Id. at 2010.
[V/ol. 11:2
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In invalidating this restriction, a majority accepted the rationale"3 that the
Due Process Clause requires in recognized areas of privacy, e.g., the decision
of whether or not to bear a child, that a state is justified in interfering only
if it can advance a compelling state interest." The Court found that a
state law which restricted the distribution of contraceptives placed a burden
upon an individual's freedom to make such a private decision. The majority
analogized the case to those of Roe, Bolton, and Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth" since the statutes invalidated in those cases
had also not prohibited "abortions outright but limited in a variety of ways
a woman's access to them."7 " The Court went on to advance the proposition
that:
The significance of these cases is that they establish that the same test
must be applied to state regulations that burden an individual's right
to decide to prevent conception or terminate pregnancy by substantially
limiting access to the means of effectuating that decision as is applied
to state statutes that prohibit the decision entirely. Both types of regu-
lation "may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest' and...
must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests
at stake.""
Justice Marshall agreed that the previous cases decided by the Court
do not support the majority's distinction which he characterized as dis-
tinguishing between "laws that absolutely prevent exercise of the fundamental
right to abortion and those that 'merely' make its exercise difficult for somo
people."7 " He suggested that the majority developed such a distinction
because of the inadequacy of the traditional two-tiered analysis; namely,
that a law subjected to strict scrutiny will sometimes too easily fall and a
law required to meet the mere rationality test will too easily be upheld."9
To alleviate this problem, he again suggested"0 that a more reasonable
and workable approach would be to carefully weigh three factors, "the
importance of the governmental benefits denied, the character of the class,
73 Id. at 2018. Justice Brennan wrote for the Court and five other justices joined in Part III
which states this rationale.
74 97 S. Ct. at 2017.
75 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The restrictions in Danforth were based on the requirement of spousal
consent to an elective abortion. Those declared unconstitutional in Bolton were hospital
accreditation requirements, committee approval, two-doctor concurrence, and residence
requirements. 410 U.S. at 194-200.
76 97 S. Ct. at 2018.
77d., citing 410 U.S. at 155.
78 97 S. Ct. at 2396.
70 Id.
80 See generally Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307. (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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and the asserted state interests."'" In his subsequent analysis of these factors in
this case, Justice Marshall found that the significance of the first two far
outweigh the asserted state interest in "encouraging childbirth."
As to underlying policy in these decisions, Justice Powell has sug-
gested that an issue so fraught with substantial social and economic over-
tones should be left to the elected representatives and not the Court.8" On
the other hand, there is the differing opinion of Justice Marshall wherein
he identifies a constitutionally imposed duty of the Supreme Court to
protect the rights of those who are "poor and powerless" and virtually
unrepresented among the powerful and well-financed lobbyists who greatly
influence Congress.8" Also, the majority cannot escape the fact that by
ruling on the constitutionality of a state law, they greatly influence the
political processes regardless of the determination made. As to the influence
of the Court's decision, Professor Bickel pointed out that a ruling of
constitutionality may have unintended and far-ranging results:
It is true enough that the Court does not approve or otherwise anoint
a legislative policy when it finds it not unconstitutional. No doubt,
in one of the late Charles P. Curtis' phrases, "to call a statute con-
stitutional is no more of a compliment than it is to say that it is not
intolerable." But, though not a compliment, it is a not inconsequential
appreciation. To declare that a statute is not intolerable because it
is not inconsistent with principle amounts to a significant intervention
in the political process different in degree only from a declaration of
unconstitutionality. It is no small matter, as Professor Black has argued,
to "legitimate" a legislative measure. The Court's prestige, the spell it
casts as a symbol, enable it to entrench and solidify measures that may
have been tentative in the conception or that are on the verge of
abandonment in the execution. The Court, regardless of what it intends,
can generate consent and may impart permanence.8"
Evidence of that can be seen in legislation now pending in both houses of
Congress which in some cases includes stricter regulation of abortion funding
than that condoned in the instant cases.85
The extent to which the consequences of these decisions will affect
the rights recognized in Roe remains to be seen. It does appear highly
probable that the practical effects will be felt by a majority of the nation's
women who might wish to have nontherapeutic abortions. The reason of-
81 97 S. Ct. at 2396.
82 Id. at 2373 n.15.
aa Id. at 2394, 2398.
84 Bickel, The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 48 (1961).
85 The New Abortion Debate, 104 Commonwealth 451 (1977).
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fered for the individual's decision to have an abortion and the wealth of
the woman involved will determine how significantly she is affected. Those
who are not able to afford private doctors or the travel expenses needed to
find available facilities (if the public facilities in their area are closed to
them) will have no way to effectuate their decisions safely and legally.
The Court's requirement that state interference must be "direct" to
warrant strict scrutiny will most likely affect other welfare and right to
privacy issues. If this is a new direction, as the dissenting justices suggest,
many areas of the law which now appear settled may be open to new attack.
Another significant aspect of these decisions is the seeming ease with
which the state met the rationality test. This would appear to be somewhat
of a retreat from the Court's detailed analysis in such welfare and right to
privacy cases as U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno" and Eisenstadt
v. Baird,7 where the Court scrutinized closely the rational basis asserted by
a state for a challenged classification.8 In Maher, the Court itself, without
the State's assertion, assumed the rational basis for the state's action to be
that of "encouraging childbirth," even going so far as to predict hypothetical
demographic concerns a state might have to justify such an interest.8"
Also noteworthy was the majority's complete avoidance of any dis-
cussion of due process analysis which had predominated in most of the
cases dealing with the right to privacy in the context of contraceptives or
abortions. If the right to choose an abortion is derived from the due process lib-
erty guarantees, it seems incomplete to divorce such analysis from a case which
involves that right. Whether this approach resulted from a failure of the
respondents to present a due process argument or because the Court found
of its own accord that the due process analysis was inappropriate may be
made clearer if the Court addresses similar issues in future cases. But since
the majority characterized the right being asserted as one not previously
recognized by the Court (i.e., "right to an abortion"), it is doubtful that
an emphasis on due process would have led to a different result.
The Court faced sensitive and controversial issues in these cases which
were compounded by the welfare context in which they were raised. Because
of the conclusion that state restriction on abortions of Medicaid recipients
does not offend the Constitution, the state and federal legislative bodies
86413 U.S. 528 (1973).
S 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
88 Butler, Right to Abortion Under Medicaid, 7 CLEARING HOUSE REV. 713, 716 (1974).
89 See Justice Brennan's dissent, 97 S. Ct. at 2390.
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must decide what the will of the American people is in this area." The
spread of welfare as a way of life, and the enduring poverty of millions
of families already too large and financially, physically and psychologically
unable to cope with unplanned and unwanted children are serious conse-
quences which may result if this large group is denied their only access to
abortion." The abortion issue has significant moral and religious overtones
which cannot be overlooked, but certainly the legislators are under a duty
to recognize that the varying moral and religious views of those most
affected by the law are worthy of as much consideration as the well defined
views of those who are able to lobby extensively. 2
Therefore, although the Court has found that the letter of the law
has not been violated by these legislative restrictions on funding abortions
for indigent women, certainly the spirit of the law appears to have been
violated. Hopefully, legislators will decide that at least in the first trimester
of pregnancy, a poor woman as well as a wealthy one should have the right
to decide with her doctor, in a purely private way, what is the appropriate
choice for her. And that choice, whether it be abortion or live birth, will
be funded where necessary in order to uphold equal protection of the law.
CONSTANCE LEISTIKO
"90 See The Unborn and the Born Again, THE NEw REPUBLIC, July 2, 1977, at 5-6 for
discussion of polls indicating that the majority sees the abortion decision as a private one
free of government control.
91 See generally The American Underclass, TIME, August 29, 1977, at 14. Besides giving a
view of how poverty affects those born into it and unable to get out, the article suggests
that welfare has become a way of life for this class.
92 See generally Punitive and Tragic, NATION, July 2, 1977, at 34.
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